อธิบายการเมืองไทยร่วมสมัย
พื้นที่โจร พื้นที่รัฐ และชาติยาธิปไตย
Sovereignty / Nationalist Sovereignty
ศ.ดร. นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ : เขียน
นักวิชาการอาวุโส มหาวิทยาลัยเที่ยงคืน
Robert Holliday : แปล

บทความอธิบายการเมืองไทยร่วมสมัยนี้ ในภาคภาษาไทยเคยได้รับการตีพิมพ์แล้ว
บนหน้าหนังสือพิมพ์มติชนสุดสัปดาห์ และนำมาเผยแพร่บนเว็บไซต์มหาวิทยาลัยเที่ยงคืน ในลำดับที่ 1053.
ซึ่งเป็นผลงานของศาสตราจารย์ ดร.นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์ ประกอบด้วย ๑. รัฏฐาธิปปัตย์ และ ๒. ชาติยาธิปไตย
สำหรับบนหน้าเว็บเพจนี้ ได้รับการแปลเป็นภาษาอังกฤษโดย Robert Holliday
เพื่อนำไปเผยแพร่ใน Bookazine และ Website ของโครงการ Documenta 12
คลิกอ่านภาษาไทย

Quotation
Thailand's attainment of nationhood occurred gradually under a system of absolute monarchy,
beginning during the reign of King Rama V, and it did not come into being independent
of the absolute monarchical system. On the contrary, it was constantly directed, guided,
and managed by that system. Thai nationalism is of a kind that has spread down from above.
The upper strata of the social structure were the first be assigned importance in the nation,
and the phenomenon gradually spread downward to the lower strata of the social structure, the common people.
(midnightuniv(at)gmail.com)

บทความเพื่อประโยชน์ทางการศึกษา
ข้อความที่ปรากฏบนเว็บเพจนี้ ได้มีการแก้ไขและตัดแต่งไปจากต้นฉบับบางส่วน
เพื่อความเหมาะสมเป็นการเฉพาะสำหรับเว็บไซต์แห่งนี้
มหาวิทยาลัยเที่ยงคืน ลำดับที่ ๑๑๗๖
เผยแพร่บนเว็บไซต์นี้ครั้งแรกเมื่อวันที่ ๓ มีนาคม ๒๕๕๐
(บทความทั้งหมดยาวประมาณ ๑๐.๕ หน้ากระดาษ A4)

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

พื้นที่โจร พื้นที่รัฐ และชาติยาธิปไตย
Sovereignty / Nationalist Sovereignty (Chaatiyaathipatai)
Robert Holliday : แปล

1. Sovereignty
Since I've never studied either political science or law I can write about the subject of sovereignty very easily, unburdened by the "power and authority" of an academic degree. Almost ten years ago I was asked by a lawyer who is widely admired, including by me, where the difference lay between an order given by the government and one given by a bandit. He had explained that, from the stand point of legal philosophy (or perhaps some schools of it), there is no difference at all. I've been unable to answer his question for almost ten years. Even though the government had been taken over again and again, sometimes using weapons, sometimes using ballot boxes, I wasn't able to come up with an answer. It has only been recently, after the government was seized once again, that I've been able to answer it to myself clearly.

I think there are two different meanings to the question put to me by the attorney mentioned above, but both of them point to a difference between an order given by a bandit and one given by the State.

1. First I'd like to discuss the order given by the bandit. When he approaches us with his knife or gun in a secluded place and commands us to hand over our valuables, we (or at least I) would do best to do what he says and in that way, stay alive.

2. When you think about it, this situation seems no different from that of a command that comes from the government. Someone has been living on a piece of land for many years and all of a sudden the government shows up armed with the Forestry Department, the police, a prosecuting attorney, and the courts and says, "Get your rice the hell off my property, because this land belongs to me and I'm going to do what I want with it. Whether it gets made into a forest or a night safari is up to me." If he wants to stay free and alive the farmer (or at least me, if I'm in his shoes) will collect my rice and belongings and get the hell out of there.

But there are some important differences between these two kinds of orders, and they are important enough to deserve close attention.

First, the government can't issue its orders in obscure, hidden places. The police who abducted Mr. Somchai Nilaphaijitr were following bandits' orders, not government ones. Those who were behind this deed, no matter how much official state authority they may have had, wouldn't dare say that the police who did it were following government orders.

The fact that the government can't issue commands in secluded, out-of-the-way places is what makes the orders it gives very different from those given by bandits. When a bandit orders us to hand over our belongings we have no one to help us, because the order was given to us alone. No one else is involved. But when the State orders us to clear off of land that our ancestors farmed, we have plenty of friends on our side: others who have been ordered off their land and still others who area afraid that the government is getting too unruly and poses a threat to them, too. Another way of saying it is that a State order is a social act, not an individual one as in the case of an order given by a bandit.

This very fact imposes a partial limit on the power of the State, because its true authority does not reside in the barrel of a gun (not all of the people standing in front of the gun barrel can be shot). It is found in the shared assent of the State's citizens, regardless of whether this assent has been obtained through trickery, bribery, psychological bullying, or the offering of bait in the form of deceptive promises of material benefits, prestige, rewards connected with tradition or religion, etc. Orders issued by the State, even deceptive or fraudulent ones, most receive the assent of others in society.

Secondly, for the reasons given above state orders may be subject to negotiation, and not only in parliament but on the street as well. It is possible to evade the government's surveillance (by disappearing into the forests of Thailand, for example, or the concrete jungles of California) or to bribe state officials. This means that laws are government orders (and this includes those issued by governments established through a coup d'etat) that can only have effect with the assent of society, while orders given by bandits are not required to.

Considering this, to anyone who thinks that, when a government has been seized, the party who seized it has full sovereignty, and that any orders given by that party are the same as orders issued by the State as a whole, I have to ask, is that really true? Isn't it a little too simplistic and shallow?

The explanation given by the lawyer mentioned above most likely had the secondary meaning that a command given by a bandit in his hideout is no different from an order given by the government.

When a bandit orders his gang to get ready to rob a rich household, his command is in no way different from an order given by the government to a garlic farmer to grow something else because a new F.T.A. with China forbids garlic to be cultivated for sale. The bandit thinks of the benefits that the whole gang stands to gain. Even though robbing the house is risky and some of the gang members may be killed, the income of the gang as a whole will increase and its continued existence will be assured. Is this any different from sacrificing a garlic farmer so that others can benefit in the name of the security and long life of the State?

But even so, I still think that there are important differences between the State and a bandits' hideout (which make for a difference between an order given by the government and one coming from a bandit).

Why does a bandits' hideout exist, and how does it sustain itself?
I would guess that a bandits' hideout exists to make its living by robbery (plundering livestock, crops, land and other property was a common way to get food and stay alive in the times before there were states and governments), and for that reason is surrounded by enemies. First among these is the State, whose duty it is to eliminate rebellious elements, including bandits who make their living in ways it forbids. Then there are those whom the bandits have already robbed, and others who are afraid of becoming their victims. As a result, an important part of the bandit's existence is protecting himself from a world of people who are not his friends. He has to be ready at all times to fight to defend himself.

For this same reason, neither Sriprach nor Sunthon Phu was born and raised in a bandits' hideout. Creativity, whether it be in the arts or in other areas of knowledge, does not flourish in such places, and this isn't because the bandits lack intelligence. It is because the conditions under which they live are not conducive to the development of creativity. The governing of a hideout leaves no opportunity for developing anything other than the greatest striking force possible, or to put it another way, the raw power of a bandit gang is based on its collective "fist". The bandit must be constantly alert to the striking force of everyone around him, and to limit it. If he sees someone getting too strong he must kill him, just as Khun Paen became the victim of Nang Buakhlee's murderous plan.

On the other hand, the State relieves all of us of the burden of such warfare, clearing the way for us to make our living in other ways. It allows us to nurture the talents of a Sriprach, a Sunthon Phuu, or an Einstein. Of course, we might also use our resources to nurse tyrants. Tyrants do not get their power exclusively from their ability to hurt or punish. They are dependent on many government mechanisms, including the educational system, television, and a variety of shared ideals that are used as tools. And it is these same tools that the population uses to take away the tyrant's power later, while the State continues to exist, with the opportunity still there to reduce the importance of force in the formation of the new center of authority.

So I can't see the State and a bandits' hideout as being the same thing, and I think that many people will feel the same way. The government is most definitely not a bandits' lair, and the most important reason is that the bases upon which they stand are different. The foundation upon which the State rests is (to put it in a word) morality. Even when a state acts in a way that is immoral, it must offer moral reasons for its actions. A gang of bandits is under no obligation to cite moral reasons for what it does, or to base its existence on morality.

In using the word "morality" I don't mean anything deeper or more complex than being aware of other people and things rather than simply of personal benefit when deciding upon one's actions. In ancient times, the Thai state referred to the idea of being a bridge to a world that approached Nirvana. Western governments of the past had something similar in mind when the spoke of the "celestial city". Even today there are references to things that benefit the world but what they mean by "the world" is "the State", all of its citizens, not any particular person. For the state of the future, morality should encompass the perfect and lasting well-being of the world.

For bandit gangs and mafias, the benefits they are interested in are material gains for their members only, so the word "morality" isn't really appropriate.

Morality (at least in the sense given above) is something that cannot be absent from the State. A government will claim to assign greater importance to it than it does to it capacity for force, whether sincerely or not. This stress on morality gives the population a deep and comforting feeling of confidence that their lives will continue on smoothly. But if the government is taken over by force, those feelings may disappear because the people are no longer sure if the moral that had been the basis of their state still exists. The way in which a government is seized is therefore more important than who it is that has taken it over.

If sovereignty resides in the hands of those who have seized the country by whatever means, where will the difference lie between the State and a bandits' hideout? Because in such a case the power upon which the state is based is no longer a moral one. In my view, simply considering that sovereignty rests with the party who have taken over the government is extremely dangerous to the country in the long term. I understand that when a bandit holds us a gunpoint he usually wants our material possessions, and concede we must hand them over to him. But if he forces us to announce publicly that robbery is a righteous act, I don't think that we have to comply, because as I stated at the beginning, a bandit's power has its place secluded environments, and can't operate in a public.

2. Nationalist Sovereignty (Chaatiyaathipatai)
Sunitsuda Ekachai, in her column in the Bangkok Post, has asked what flaw it is in Thailand's culture that makes us always wind up, if not with crooked politicians, then with military dictators.

I am trying to cure a case of the hiccups by pondering an answer. The first ones that flooded into my head were the ones that we hear so often:

Thais lack patience and endurance.

Thais prefer to look for quick, superficial solutions rather than principles that offer long-term benefits.

Thai society is too weak to find political solutions to big problems on its own, so we elect leaders to act as bosses rather than servants. Then, when the boss misbehaves we have to find a new boss by way of the ballot box.

Democracy is a culture of which Thais are not a part. And so on.

This seems to be working. My hiccups are going away, so I've been able to focus my mind enough to formulate some questions and answers of my own. The answers are all true, but at the same time each one invites a lot of new questions. I'll start with a simple one: Are the traits mentioned above part of a permanent, unvarying Thai culture or of one that changes in response to the prevailing situation?

I think that some Thais would answer one way and some the other. I myself would say that there is change because I believe that culture is the product of relationships that are always changing according to what is taking place around it. But believing that, I then have to ask when these traits appeared, and under the influence of what situation. I will try to answer just this question, without mentioning the many others that it invites.

But before answering I'd like to point out that the cultural traits cited above can't be explained in terms of Thai history once you go back a certain distance into the past. In fact, sometimes we encounter their opposites. For example, it is said that Thai lack endurance, but we have put up with many ineffectual or oppressive monarchs. King Prasatthong, for example, is said to have been extremely cruel, but he died naturally on his sickbed.

At the same time it can be said that patience and endurance haven't been pushed to excessive levels by the Thais of the past. Thai history provides more than a few examples of public uprisings against resented rulers, especially in the North and in Isan. And cases of citizens simply walking away from public registry districts without notification to the authorities were common throughout Thailand.

Before saying that Thais prefer the quick and superficial it is important to specify the situation. There are people who use a large part of their income to make merit and offer charity in hope of rewards in their next life, or of attaining Nirvana. How can they be called impatient or interested only in quick fixes and superficial measures?

Nor can it be said that democratic principles are absent from Thai culture. Thai tradition has great respect for the minority voice, especially in the countryside. Even when the wishes of the majority are being followed, care is taken to ensure that the minority do not lose face. This respect for the minority opinion can be called the soul of Thai-style democracy. Otherwise we would have a tyrannical system where 19 million or 16 million voices always decided everything. On the other hand, it is true that so much consideration is given to the minority opinion because the channels that Thai culture offers for dissent are traditionally very narrow, so it is necessary to try to "swallow" the minority view and counter it gently.

This is why it is difficult to talk in absolute terms about a democratic culture. I doubt that a culture that is purely democratic exists in any society. We admire the idea of a culture founded on democratic principles, but in trying to create it we only choose those features of western-style democracy that we want and casually discard those that don't fit our specific case.

Therefore, I think it is necessary to understand the conditions facing Thai culture as it is now and what it is that makes us fall victim to the destiny that Sunitsuda speaks of. Even if some aspects of it are the same as they were in the ancient past, the conditions in which it exists now are different. The force that sustains the culture consists exclusively of the conditions that we happen to encounter now, and is not a heritage that we have been handed down from the past. I believe that the culture that does not allow us to govern ourselves as a democracy is entirely one that came into being together with the formation of our nation state in the recent past. Consequently it can be called a "national culture", and this Thai "national culture" does run well on the track of the democratic system. This is the reason why Thailand's progress on the road of democracy has always been one of fits, starts, and jolts.

Thailand's attainment of nationhood occurred gradually under a system of absolute monarchy, beginning during the reign of King Rama V, and it did not come into being independent of the absolute monarchical system. On the contrary, it was constantly directed, guided, and managed by that system. Thai nationalism is of a kind that has spread down from above. The upper strata of the social structure were the first be assigned importance in the nation, and the phenomenon gradually spread downward to the lower strata of the social structure, the common people.

This process was the direct opposite of the pattern nationalism has followed in many other societies, where the lower levels of the structure are the first to acquire importance.

As a result, when the Thai people began to realize that there was a new entity - the Thai Nation - that they were a part of, and that it was an important aspect of their identity, the nation was already had an anti-democratic nature. Since then the ideals of nationalism in Thailand have been used to obstruct or oppose the attainment of democratic ideals right up until the present.

The Thai revolution of 1932 changed the system of government, but it wasn't a genuine populist revolution. It opened the way for politicians, and especially military leaders, to use the nation as a tool to destroy the democratic rights and freedoms of the people, and with assent, or at least an unwillingness to resist on their part, too. I think that this cultural weakness in Thai society under the democratic system that we hear about so often is partially the result of the newness of the nation that has shaped itself in Thailand only recently, and not a national trait that has been passed down through the ages.

At the same time, there are any more aspects of this weakness whose causes I suspect can be found in Thai nationalism. For example, our impatience in the area of politics - our unwillingness to allow democracy the time it needs to correct and stabilize itself. This tendency is connected with the national "spirit" that we have conceived.

What do we mean when we talk about a national spirit? I think it is primarily a memory connected with the country's past or, to put it another way, the nation's history. And as we well know, memories of a nation's history, any nation's history, are entirely fabricated. I think that the Thai history that we remember teaches us that Thais are incapable of waiting.

This is because Thai history is a record of leaders and great men, not of the nation as a whole. So people infected with this kind of national spirit always look to leaders to solve problems. They don't think that they themselves have the potential to solve national problems. I've already said a lot about this issue, and don't want to say any more.

There is one more area of Thai history that I would like to discuss, and I wonder if there are others who will agree with me: When we read Thai history, I get the sensation that it always moves directly ahead in a straight line with no meandering or a zigzagging off to the sides. No matter what part of history is taken as a starting point, development is seen to take place in stages. Beginning with the unification of the country there is incessant advancement: the consolidation of power at a central point, contact and trade with foreign countries. If an enemy sacks the capital, after a short time sovereignty is restored and the country is back on its way ahead. Make some adjustments to bring things up to date and you have the modern and progressive country that we see today.

Whatever wanderings that do occur in the line of history are very short-term and are caused by the harmful actions of outsiders. Those who embrace the Thai national spirit therefore have no awareness of long periods of suffering. They count on a process of change in which they move ahead into the future together with a population strong in body and mind. I think that anyone possessed by a spirit of this kind will not have the patience to deal with problems, because he will feel that any problem that persists over time is unnatural.

(Compare this view with the history of China, especially that of the Warring States Period, before there was a single Chinese emperor, which went on for centuries. The annals of China record much more misery than happiness among the Chinese people. Problems were more natural than the lack of them.)

Unnatural events are portents of bad things to come, and must quickly be set right. Any method can be used to put them straight, just as long as they are corrected. Other matters can be dealt with later.

In conclusion, it may make some people uncomfortable, but it has to be said that if democracy is to be securely established in Thai society, we will have to revise our concepts of nationhood and of nationalism, because our nation, as we have been taught to embrace it, is an enemy of democracy, and has always subverted it.

(I also think that if anyone has read this far I can conclude one more thing: Protect our "nation", and don't get all caught up with democracy.)

 

 

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